[see also bibliography, part 1, part 2, part 3, part 4, part 6, part 7, part 8] It is simple enough to recognize the importance of an ability to rapidly evaluate a situation, the need for a quick wit and presence of mind in order to continually perceive the most promising action, but more is required to actually act on this perception of the situation. Knowing the uncertainty of the terrain, the incomplete information on which I base my actions as well as the unpredictability inherent in my interaction with others, I may become plagued by doubt, unable to face the uncertain result of my action for myself and others, which "often, no, even regularly, stands in completely inadequate and often even pradoxical relation to its original meaning" (Weber). To overcome the natural doubts that must spring from this situation in which I do not fully understand the circumstances nor the potential results of my action, to act despite the knowledge that events may conspire against me and that 'things could go wrong' - perhaps catastrophically - I must have a certain kind of mental strength, a species of courage Clausewitz calls determination. This is not "physical courage" but "the courage to accept responsibility, courage in the face of a moral danger... The role of determination is to limit the agonies of doubt and the perils of hesitation when the motives for action are inadequate" (Clausewitz 102-3), which is always and everywhere the case for the strategic actor. In fact, this acceptance of responsibility for consequences which I may not intend is implicit in any action:
By action, I make myself responsible for everything; I accept the aid of external accidents just as I accept their betrayals - "the transformation of necessity into contingence and vice versa." I claim to be the master not only of my intentions, but also of what events are going to make of them. I take the world and others as they are. I take myself as I am and I answer for all. To act is... to deliver oneself up to this law. (Merleau-Ponty 72)
To accept this responsibility is difficult enough when we consider expressive speech between essentially private individuals; it is particularly daunting in the complex and morally ambiguous milieu of the Weberian state that is ultimately characterized by the means of violence. "In numerous instances the attainment of 'good' ends is bound to the fact that one must be willing to pay the price of using morally dubious means or at least dangerous ones - and facing the possibility or even the probability of evil ramifications" (Weber).
[next: part 6]